Notes / Outline on Aristotle's De Anima (On the Soul), Books I (Incomplete) and II (Complete) (Draft) 9/17/13

De Anima Notes

Book I

(Chapter I)

• Aim is to grasp and understand, first, soul's essential nature, and secondly its properties
• Soul seems to require body for its proper functioning, as form is to matter.

(Chapter II)

• We need to study predecessors' views on the soul
• Predecessors focused on two unique characteristics that belong to things with a soul: movement and sensation.
• Democritus compared soul to spherical fire and soul atoms. He believe soul atoms were spherical since that would most cause movement in other things.
• Some adapted view that soul is first movement in things, that which is itself unmoved.
• Plato fashions soul out of elements in Timaeus: Animal-itself is compounded of Idea of the One with everything else of the person being constituted in similar ways.
• All characterize soul by three marks: Movement, Sensation, Incorporeality. All of these are traced back to the first principles.

(Chapter III)

• Let's begin with movement because it is impossible that soul should move itself.
• 2 possible senses in which anything may be moved:
• indirectly, owing to something other than itself (e.g. sailors on a ship)
• directly, owing to itself (e.g. ship being moved by something else)
• Is soul directly moved?
• Four species of movement:
• locomotion
• alteration
• diminution
• growth
• If movement is not incidental but belonging to soul by nature, and the four species of movement involve place, then place must be natural to the soul.
• If essence of soul be to move itself, its being moved cannot be incidental to it, as is the case with "white" and "three cubits long." These latter two characteristics do move but not apart from the thing of which they predicate. Therefore, these things move incidentally and not of themselves; hence, they do not have place.
• If the soul is to move itself essentially, and not be incidentally moved, then it must have a place. Does it?
• Further, if movement is natural to soul, there must be counter-movement that is unnatural to it, and conversely.
• The terminus ad quem (boundary at which) of a thing's natural movement is place of its natural rest, and terminus ad quem of enforced movement is enforced rest.
• How does this apply to soul?
• Further, we observe soul to originate movement in the body.

Incomplete notes on Book I

Book II

(Chapter I)

• Let's make a fresh start now. What is soul?
• We have several senses in which we recognize substance:
• in the sense of matter, which in itself is not "a this"
• in the sense of form or essence, which is that in virtue of which a thing is called "a this"
• in the sense of both form and matter
• Matter is potentiality and form is actuality. Of the latter, there are two grades related to one another (e.g. knowledge to the exercise of knowledge)
• Now there are differences among substances:
• natural bodies
• living (i.e. self-nutrition and growth / decay)
• not-living
• Every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite (i.e. body as the material substratum and the principle or form of its animation / life)
• But since a natural body is a body of such-and-such a kind, the body --- and only the body --- cannot be soul; the body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it.
• Hence the soul must be the substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it.
• But substance --- that is, in the sense of form --- is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body. 
• The word "actuality" of the soul has two senses. What do we mean by actuality in this case?:
• the possession of knowledge
• the actual exercise of knowledge
• Soul must be actuality in the former sense, viz. the possession of knowledge, for both sleeping and waking presuppose existence of the soul and also correspond to possession of knowledge --- but not employed --- and exercise of knowledge respectively
• Yet, knowledge possessed must come prior to its employment, since an employment of knowledge requires knowledge to be employed.
• Therefore, soul is actuality in the first sense.
• For this reason, soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially within it.
• And by grades of actuality we mean the following:
• first grade of actuality: the vital capacity or power in the substance for movement (e.g. being able to hear and able to see)
• grades of actuality beyond the first: the vital capacity or power in act (e.g. seeing and hearing)
• The body so described is an organized body with parts. We can dismiss, therefore, the question whether the body and soul are one. 
• Unity has many senses: in this case, the relation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality
• Answer to "what is soul?":
• substance in the sense which corresponds to the definitive formula of a thing's essence
• "the essential whatness" of a body of the character just assigned, viz. organized or possessed potentially of life
• Even other natural / artificial bodies have souls (e.g. axes, trees, books, etc.) for the above reasons.
• By "potentially capable of living," we mean that which still retains it the principle of life and not that which has lost the soul it had.
• Even seeds and fruits are bodies which possess the above qualification though only potentially (i.e. they are at a further remove from actuality than the fully formed and organized body)
• Analogy for describing soul's actuality in the body:
• soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the power in the tool, which are first grades of actuality
• Soul, therefore, inseparable from the body --- or at least some parts of it are (if it has parts)
• reason: actuality of parts of soul are nothing but actualities of bodily parts or organs
• Yet, some parts of the soul may be separable since they are not actualities of any bodily parts / organs whatsoever...
• Conclusion of sketch or outline determination of the nature of soul

(Chapter II)

• Since what is more evident or perhaps more observable by us is "what in itself is confused" (413a12-14), we must begin this way, and we must give a clear definition in the form analogous to the conclusion of a syllogism
• my notes: what is a syllogism?:
• minimally, two premises which lead to one conclusion e.g.
• All men are animals (P₁)
• Socrates is a man (P₂)
• ∴ Socrates is an animal (C)
• "...what has soul in it differs from what has not in that the former displays life" (413a21-22)
• Now "living" has more than one meaning:
• thinking, perception, or local movement and rest;
• movement in the sense of nutrition, decay and growth
• Power of self-nutrition can isolated from the other higher "living powers" (i.e. thinking, perceiving, etc.), but these powers cannot be isolated from self-nutrition
• The self-nutritive potencies in a thing allow us to call something living at all (e.g. plants, trees, etc.), and even the higher animals have these potencies (e.g. monkeys, human beings, etc.)
• Yet, the possession of sensation leads us to classify living things as animals and not merely plants
• What do we mean primarily by sensation?:
• touch: power of self-nutrition can be isolated from touch and sensation generally, so too can touch be isolated from all other forms of sense (and here Aristotle means analytically speaking --- in terms of their taxonomical structure)
• Definition of the above will be discussed later in Book III. For now, it suffices to say that soul is the source of these phenomena and is characterized by them:
• viz. powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking, and motivity
• Is each of the aforementioned a soul or a part of a soul?:
• If part of a soul in what sense?:
• parts of a soul in definition only?
• or, parts of a soul in definition as well as in "local situation" (413b15)?
• In the case of plants, when divided are observed to continue to live though "removed to a distance from one another" (413b17-19).
• What does Aristotle mean by "divided"? Possibilities:
• division with respect to magnitude and quantity (e.g. cutting strawberries)
• division with respect to determinate matter under qualified species (e.g. Alex and Casey under the species "rational animal," many with respect to one)
• division with respect to various potencies of the soul as mentioned (413b13-15)
• The soul of each individual plant prior to division was actually one and potentially many (i.e. "in insects which have been cut in two; each of the segments possesses both sensation and local movement; and if sensation, necessarily also imagination and appetition; for, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain and, where these, necessarily also desire" (413b20-23))
• clarification: one species to many particulars? unity of potencies in single actuality? Surely, cutting insects into segments does not allow for each one of them to retain the same unity of potencies (i.e. cutting a cockroach along its thorax kills the insect and thereby incidentally corrupts the soul). Could it be the case that, in insects, neither sensation nor local movement can be found without the other? Needs clarification
• No evidence yet about division of potencies with respect to mind or the power to think, which seems to be a very different kind of soul. In what way?:
• from what is eternal to what is perishable
• capable of existing in isolation from all other psychic powers --- needs clarification
• All the other parts of the soul (vegetative and sensitive potencies of the soul) incapable of separate existence though distinguishable by definition (413b27-30).
• "If opining is distinct from perceiving, to be capable of opining and to be capable of perceiving must be distinct..." (413b29-30):
• clarification: recall that Aristotle enumerated different potencies of the human soul (i.e. capacity for seeing, capacity for thinking, etc.) and different actualizations which correspond to these potencies (i.e. seeing, thinking, etc.). Yet, seeing can only be the actualization of the subject's capacity for seeing and not his or her capacity for hearing since every act is restricted by potency, so that only a certain kind of substratum can receive the form proper to its distinct actualization. Therefore, every act responds to its proper potency and must be considered distinct from one another as mentioned in the above quote.
• Therefore, we can distinguish between different animals based upon their unique powers
• Two phrases with two meanings:
• "that whereby we know"
• with respect to knowledge --- knowing by
• with respect to soul as the first principle --- knowing with
• similarly, "that whereby we are healthy"
• with respect to health as the form
• with respect to the body and its parts as the matter
• "knowledge" and "health" can be seen as the formal constituents which actualize their respective capacities:
• capacity to know
• capacity to be healthy
• Soul therefore must be defined as such:
• ratio or formulable essence (414a13) and not a matter or subject
• As was said, substance has three meanings:
• form
• matter
• complex of both
• Of these three:
• matter is potentiality
• form is actuality
• The mistake of former thinkers was to fit the soul into the body while neglecting to elaborate upon the body's definite specification of kind or character  (414a22-24)
• Conclusion: soul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled

(Chapter III)

• Of the following psychic powers, some kinds of living things possess all, some less than all, others one only:
• "the nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the power of thinking" (414a30-31)
• "If any order of living things has the sensory, it must also have the appetitive; for appetite is the genus of which desire, passion, and wish are species" (414b1-3)
• We will classify the former distinctions in Book III. For now, it is safe to say that all animals that possess sense of touch also have appetition. Why?
• whatever has the sense for touch, has the capacity for pleasure and pain which require objects of pleasure and objects of pain present to it; the desire for objects of pleasure is called appetite
• clarification: Aristotle does not have in mind plants, which cannot in this sense "touch." Touching is a qualitatively different activity than receiving stimuli, which is what plants do. Only those living organisms which have nutritive potencies in addition to sensitive potencies (e.g. capacity to touch) can be said to have desires for objects of pleasure, or the appetite.
• We will examine imagination later in Book III
• A too general definition of soul, moreover, would be absurd. There would be no distinctions of anything if that should be the case.
• Each successive and common term indicating species contains its preceding genus in potency to that determination (414b28-32)
• e.g. the sensory power the self-nutritive
• Hence, we must in the case of each order of living things ask, what is its soul (that of a man, an animal, and a plant)
• We will discuss the orderly succession of the above terms (man, animal, and plant respectively) more in Book III
• In any case, the power of perception is never found apart from the power of self-nutrition even though the latter can be found apart from the former, viz. plants.
• Even so, a small minority of animals possess calculation and thought. Those living organisms which possess these rational potencies contain all that the lower animals and plants have (i.e. sensitive and nutritive faculties)
• Conclusion: "It is evident that the way to give the most adequate definition of soul is to seek in the case of each of its forms for the most appropriate definition" (415a13-15)

(Chapter IV)

• Necessary for student of these forms of soul (e.g. that of a plant, lower animal, and a human) to accomplish the following:
• to find a definition of each which expresses what it is
• in order to understand thinking, perceptive, and nutritive potencies; we must give an account of the enablers of thinking and perceiving: "If this is correct, we must on the same ground go yet another step farther back and have some clear view of the objects of each; thus we must start with these objects [italic mine], e.g. with food, with what is perceptible, or with what is intelligible" (415a20-23).
• My notes: contrast with the modern turn to the subject, which reversed the order of inquiry (e.g. Descartes, John Locke, etc.)
• to investigate its derivative properties
• Let's first begin with investigating nutrition and reproduction. Why?:
• nutritive soul is found among all others
• most primitive and widely distributed power of soul in virtue of which something is said to have life
• Acts which nutrition and reproduction manifest themselves:
• the use of food
• reproduction under certain conditions
• a living thing which has reached its normal development
• unmutilated
• mode of generation must not be spontaneous but teleological (i.e. end-driven by nature)
• "That is the goal towards which all things strive, that for the sake of which they do whatsoever their nature renders possible" (415b2-3).
• What does "for the sake of which" mean? Either,
• "the end to achieve which" (415b5)
• "the being in whose interest, the act is done" (415b5-6)
• No living thing is able to act according to its nature / telos continuously because of the perpetual possibility of the thing to perish
• Continues acting according to its specific not numerical nature
• my notes: this similar to Plato's participation in the Forms but not quite. What Aristotle means by this passage is that, in a series of discontinuous beings, there is similarity of behavior that occurs not because of the discrete being qua discrete being but discrete being qua specific mode of being (e.g. this blue eye and that brown eye may be different and discontinuous objects, but they retain their unity through their specific mode of being, namely "to see."
• In the case of living things, their being is to live, and their kind of soul is the underlying principle or cause of that mode of being. Also, the actuality of a potential is exactly identical with its formulable essence (415b13-17)
• Soul is also final cause of its body. Why?:
• "Nature, like mind, always does whatever its does for the sake of something, which something is its end. To that something corresponds in the case of animals the soul and in this it follows the order of nature; all natural bodies are organs of the soul" (415b15-17). This is true for plants as well as for animals --- that their bodies tend towards the preservation of the soul's interior grades of actualities (i.e. its capacity to see, think, etc.) (415b17-20).
• Recall the two senses of "that for the sake of which":
• the end to achieve which, and
• the being in whose interest, anything is or is done
• my notes: the latter sense of finality applies to the soul in relation to the body.
• Soul is also the cause of the living body as the original source of local movement, and by that Aristotle means:
• change of quality
• Take for instance sensation which Aristotle thinks is a qualitative alteration (e.g. feeling hot to feeling cold, changing from state of pleasure to state of pain, etc.). Nothing that does not have soul is capable of sensation for the reasons given in the other chapters of this book. The sensitive appetite grounds the soul's capacity for this change to occur and is therefore the underlying source of movement (415b23-25).
• change of quantity
• A prime example would be that of growth and decay, which the soul makes possible as original source of movement toward self-preservation (415b25-28).
• Aristotle transgresses to Empedocles' attempt to explain local movement of plants while also urging us to consider the function of the organs of living organisms including plants. The pre-Socratic thinkers, in other words, held that fire may have been the cause of a living organism's nutritive capacities since fire apparently has its own source of movement viz. it tends to move upwards away from the earth. Aristotle partially concedes with Empedocles that fire may be a concurrent cause but not a principle cause which is the soul --- the form of the body. Therefore, the delimiting and formulable essence of a thing is determined by the soul not matter (415b29 - 416a19).
• Nutrition and reproduction are due to one and the same psychic power viz. the nutritive power.

Incomplete notes on Book II

Book III

(Chapter IV)

• Let us turn now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks in order to determine whether or not this is separable from the other powers of the soul (429a10-12):
• in definition only
• or spatially as well
• We need to ask (429a12-13):
• what differentiates this part
• how thinking can take place
• "If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process... (429a15)
• in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or
• a process different from but analogous to that
• Thinking part of soul must therefore be capable of receiving the form of the object, not the object itself but the form of the object
• "Mind must be related to what is thinkable;" that is, mind must be potentially identical in character with the form of the object; "as sense is to what is sensible" (429a15)
• Since everything is a possible object of thought --- needs clarification (i.e. how does Aristotle know that everything is potentially intelligible in the way in which everything is not potentially sensible --- the sensitive powers are passive with regard to actual sensibles, no?) --- mind must be free from all admixture in order to know. Why?:
• "...co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block..." (429a20). My notes: possible meanings of this, what could possibly be alien to its nature?:
• if the nature of the rational powers is chiefly determined by the intelligible object; by which things are known according to their formulable essences which can, in turn, be predicated to a potentially infinite number of discrete beings under consideration; then any intelligible objects --- or perhaps any non-intelligible objects such as sensible objects --- which do not perform this function (assuming that there are any) present obstacles to the rational powers
• Yet, it seems odd to say this, since intelligible objects require discrete objects under consideration in order for them to be known. This needs more clarification.
• It follows from this that the intellectual part, like the sensitive part, "can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity" (429a20):
• My notes: in other words, the rational powers must be deprived of an intelligible in order for the transition from lowers grades of actualities to higher grades of actuality to occur viz. from being able to think to actually thinking.
• "Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body; if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g. warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms', though (1) this description holds only of the intellective soul, and (2) even this is the forms only potentially, not actually" (429a25).

Incomplete notes